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I. INTRODUCTION-POLITICAL FIRESTORMS IN THE "LAND OF THE
SNOWS"
The roof of the world, land of the snows, alleged home of the
Abominable Snowman, and place for the timeless meeting of mountain
and sky-these are the Western visions of Tibet.' Most Americans
know little else about this strange and exotic land shrouded in histori-
cal obscurity. Modern Tibet is a curious stockpot of native Tibetans
and immigrant Chinese, which until recently was seasoned with increas-
* Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. J.D., University of Connecticut; LL.M.
and S.J.D., University of Virginia; Certificate in Mandarin Chinese, Yale University. The Author
teaches International Business Transactions and Comparative United States-China Economic Law.
He has visited China numerous times in recent years, and was in China on a three-month lecture
visit when the United States House of Representatives passed the amendments to House Bill 1777
on June 18, 1987, condemning China for alleged human rights abuses in China and Tibet. Several
weeks later, he visited Tibet to conduct investigations for this study. The Author also was in Beij-
ing during the spring 1989 democracy demonstrations. The Author acknowledges with appreciation
the research assistance of Rana Tiwari, Stetson Law Class of 1988.
1. Tibet was the land used by James Hilton as a model for Shangri-La in the Utopian 1933
novel, Lost Horizon, and Tibet continues to be romanticized by the press. See Unrest Rocks the
Calm of "Shangri-La," U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Oct. 19, 1987, at 10.
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ing numbers of Western tourists, backpackers of all ages, vagabonds,
and visitors from neighboring Nepal.'
On June 4, 1989, China's 27th Army brutally crushed democracy
demonstrations that had extended for seven weeks in Beijing and other
Chinese cities.3 This crackdown, which came to be known as the "Beij-
ing Massacre," was viewed with revulsion by the free world and resulted
in economic sanctions by the United States, Japan, and Western Eu-
rope.4 In contrast, China's activities in Tibet, which also have serious
human rights implications, have received very little attention outside
the United States. Most countries remained quiet about human rights
violations in March 1989, when Beijing imposed martial law in Tibet
and reportedly shot and executed protesters.' The United States Con-
gress, however, has been openly critical of China's Tibetan policies.
During 1987 Tibet became the focal point of souring United States-
China relations when Congress focused on the "Tibet Question" in con-
gressional action challenging the Chinese record of alleged human
rights abuses in this obscure and remote land. Congress's denunciation
of China soon was followed by an unprecedented appearance before
Congress by the Dalai Lama, Tibet's god-king in exile. Soon thereafter,
violent riots erupted in Lhasa, Tibet's capital city. The Chinese reacted
bitterly, blaming the Dalai Lama for instigating the riots and members
of the United States Congress for intervening in Chinese domestic af-
fairs. The controversy over the "Tibet Question" highlights the diver-
gence of opinions between the Congress and the executive branch over
United States relations with China, and it provides a case study of the
foreign policy dilemmas that emerge when these two branches of the
United States government collide. This Article will explore the ramifi-
cations of these events, with particular attention to the impact on
United States-China relations generated by the divergent approaches
taken by the executive branch and Congress in dealing with China and
the "Tibet Question."
2. In 1987, according to official Chinese statistics, 43,500 foreigners visited Tibet and spent
more than $15 million. Many of those tourists were backpackers who entered by land from China's
Sichuan province or neighboring Nepal. Gargan, Beijing Is Said to Restrict Foreign Travel to
Tibet, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1988, at A5, col. 1.
3. See infra notes 177-95 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
5. do Rosario, The Misrule of Law, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 6, 1989, at 12.
6. Representative Daniel Mica introduced amendments to H.R. 1777 that dealt with human
rights violations in Tibet by the People's Republic of China. See 133 CONG. REc. H5218-20 (daily




II. THE CHINESE PRESENCE IN TIBET
The conflict between the Tibetans and their Chinese rulers has its
roots in a separatist religious movement but also reflects concerns over
human rights abuses. The failure to separate the two issues has clouded
debate about them. The debate that rages over whether, as the Chinese
claim, Tibet historically has been part of China's sovereign lands or
whether, as the Dalai Lama claims, Tibet is a captive country, taken
and held hostage by superior military forces against the will of the Ti-
betan people, has been viewed by most of the world for many years as
an increasingly academic issue. Neither the United States nor any other
member of the United Nations has recognized Tibet as a sovereign state
independent of China. Most Western countries, including the United
States, recognized China long after it had reasserted its rule over Tibet.
China's early claims over Tibet predate the American Revolution, 8
but because of the perennial weakness of the Chinese government,
those claims lacked credibility until the new Chinese Communist gov-
ernment launched its military initiative to reassert its sovereignty over
Tibet in 1950.1 In the face of overwhelming military odds, the sixteen-
year old Dalai Lama opted for negotiations rather than conquest. A
Seventeen Point Agreement recognizing the "peaceful liberation of Ti-
bet" by China was signed in May 1951 by the Dalai Lama's representa-
tives in Beijing, and the Dalai Lama himself subsequently signed the
agreement and returned from his brief self-imposed exile in India. 0
The Agreement allowed a semblance of self-governance to continue
under the Dalai Lama and guaranteed both religious freedoms and the
continued use of the Tibetan language. Dominance by the Chinese mili-
tary was complete.
Despite initial harmony in the new relationship, sporadic armed re-
sistance by Tibetans began to break out in 1954. The most notable re-
sistance occurred in the southeastern "Kham" region, where the fierce
Khampa tribesmen battled with Chinese regulars, often with the assis-
7. Roy, Human Rights Situation of the Tibetan People, DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1987, at 49,
51.
8. China's Manchu Qing dynasty (1644-1911) conquered Tibet after nearly 1000 years of
intermittent hostilities between the two countries. By the late nineteenth century Tibet had be-
come a sideshow in the rivalry between Britain and Czarist Russia for influence in south central
Asia. In 1910 China's Qing Dynasty used its army to reassert control over Tibet. In 1911, however,
the Nationalist revolution in China led to the collapse of China's control over Tibet. In 1913 the
Dalai Lama declared Tibet independent. Nearly four decades of stable government under the feu-
dal theocracy of the Dalai Lama's reign followed, free from foreign interference. A History of Con-
flict, WORLD PRESS REV., Dec. 1987, at 20.
9. See A. GRUNFELD, THE MAKING OF MODERN TIBET 104-06 (1987).
10. Id. at 106-07.
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tance of monks and farmers.1' The Chinese press continues to describe
the uprising as one launched by "imperialists and a small number of
reactionary elements in Tibet's upper ruling clique."'" Unable to deal
with the crisis at home, the twenty-three year old Dalai Lama fled his
summer palace, Norbulingka, in early March 1959 and sought refuge in
India, the homeland of Tibetan Buddhism. From his Indian refuge, the
Dalai Lama renounced the 1951 Tibet-China agreement and established
his "government-in-exile."' 3 In 1965 China established the Tibet Au-
tonomous Region and installed as its head the same Ngapo Ngawang
Jigme who had signed the 1951 Seventeen Point Agreement. 4
Since 1979 China has allowed the Dalai Lama to send six investiga-
tive missions to Tibet; several of those were led by close relatives of the
Dalai Lama. During 1983 and 1984 discussions with the Chinese sug-
gested that the Dalai Lama himself might soon return to China for a
fact finding trip. Positions hardened, however, in 1985, and the trip
never materialized.15
Part of the continuing tension occasioned by Chinese control of Ti-
bet has been based upon cultural differences between the Chinese and
the Tibetans and the way they view "progress" under Chinese rule. For
example, under the feudal theocracies that prevailed before 1959, the
rate of illiteracy in Tibet was ninety-five percent. There were only thir-
teen primary schools and one secondary school in what is now the Tibet
Autonomous Region. Today, 2388 primary schools and 64 high schools
exist, and about 4000 Tibetan students study in interior China. The
Chinese view these improvements as indicators of great progress. In
contrast, Tibetans view these changes as attempts by the Chinese to
propagandize communism, advance Chinese ways and language, and
denigrate religion.'6
11. Id. at 128.
12. Lobsang & Jin Yun, Tibet: History and Anecdoctes (II), BEIJING REV., June 27, 1983, at
25, 29.
13. See A. GRUNFELD, supra note 9, at 132.
14. China is divided into provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under
the Central Government. See CONST. OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA [1982] art. 30(1)
(adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress and promulgated for imple-
mentation by the Proclamation of the National People's Congress on Dec. 4, 1982) [hereinafter
1982 CONST.], English translation in 1 THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1979-1982)
1, 11 (1987) [hereinafter LAWS 1979-1982]. Other autonomous regions include Inner Mongolia and
Xinjiang. National autonomous areas enjoy a measure of self-government, subject to final author-
ity of the Party and Central Government. Id. arts. 112-22, English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-
1982, supra, at 28-30.




III. TIBET'S IMPORTANCE TO CHINA
Why have the Chinese placed so much importance on this barren
mountainous land that has remained so obscure throughout history?
Tibet, about the size of Western Europe, is a dry and arid land clinging
to the Himalayas, the highest mountain range in the world. It is largely
undeveloped, with vast stretches of moonscape with hard rocky soil and
thousands of glaciers, but very little economic development. In spite of
its apparent economic unattractiveness, Tibet has been an enduring
lure to Westerners and Easterners alike for centuries. In part the lure is
one of curiosity for the exotic. Tibet is indeed a strange, exotic land of
compelling raw beauty and isolated tranquility, with some historical ex-
ceptions. Trespassers in this "Land of Snows" have included occasional
itinerant adventurers as well as formal military expeditions by Indian,
British, Russian, and Chinese troops. Christian missionaries also ven-
tured into Tibet but made little dent in the pervasive influence of
Buddhism.17
Tibet does have an abundance of mineral resources that largely re-
mains untapped. However, the most enduring attraction that Tibet has
held for governments is its location as a buffer zone between India and
China. Bordering India, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and Burma, Tibet
serves the same role of strategic and military buffer state for China as
the autonomous regions of Xinjiang in the west and Inner Mongolia in
the north. Although de-emphasized by the Chinese press, China main-
tains a strong military presence in Tibet."' The estimated hundreds of
thousands of Chinese troops stationed in Tibet are there not only to
counter perceived threats from without by states like India, but also to
suppress opposition from within. The strategic military importance of
Tibet to China was underscored within weeks of the October 1987 riots
in Lhasa when China deployed a squadron of J-7 fighters to the Gong-
gar Airfield near Lhasa to counter Indian air force flights over the bor-
der and incursions into Tibet by India's Soviet-built MiG-25s.9
Another reason for China's adamant position on Tibet is China's
goal of consolidating those territories which it considers part of its his-
17. A. GRUNFELD, supra note 9, at 46.
18. While visiting Tibet in 1987, even before the riots began, the Author observed military
installations on the perimeter of Lhasa, and long convoys of troop transport vehicles with soldiers
on the roads leading to the capital city.
19, Covault, Chinese Deploy J-7 Fighters in Tibet to Counter Indian Threat, AvIATION
WEEK & SPACE TECH., Oct. 19, 1987, at 103. J-7 fighters are versions of the sophisticated Soviet
MiG-21 fighter plane. China also is using its newly acquired United States-built Sikorsky S70C
Black Hawk helicopters to support military operations in Tibet along the disputed border between
China and India. Black Hawk Helicopters Assist Tibetan Military Operations, AvIATION WEEK &
SPACE TECH., Oct. 19, 1987, at 104.
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torical legacy.20 Through wars, conquests, foreign invasion, and China's
own imperial neglect, key areas of "old China" fell into hostile hands.
Hong Kong was taken over by the British in 1842,21 Macao by the Por-
tuguese in 1557,22 and Taiwan by the fleeing Nationalist Army in
1949.23 China considers Tibet to be among those regions justifiably
within China's historical claims of sovereignty, and the current Chinese
move to consolidate and reunite all of its sovereign lands magnifies Ti-
bet's significance.
Agreements already have been reached with the colonial powers to
restore Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997 and over Macao in
2000. China's new "one country, two systems" policy was the key to
successful resolution of the Hong Kong negotiations. China's leader,
Deng Xiaoping, promised that although Hong Kong clearly would be a
part of China subject to Chinese sovereignty, it could continue to oper-
ate as virtually a pure capitalist system for the next fifty years. 2
This "one country, two systems" concept obviously holds a certain
appeal for those forces in Taiwan that long for reunification with their
ancestral homeland. As the octogenarian Nationalist leaders, holdovers
from Chiang Kaishek's days of battling the mainland Communists, dis-
appear from Taiwan's leadership scene, the possibility of reconciliation,
perhaps someday leading to reunification, appeared to be closer to be-
coming a reality by the time Taiwan's Finance Minister visited Beijing
in 1989.25 The ongoing effort to reunite the Chinese mainland and the
island of Taiwan, and the accompanying rhetoric of both sides, has as-
sumed a more moderate tone in recent years, perhaps in part as a result
of increasing volumes of under-the-table economic relations between
the two estranged Chinese republics.26 To the extent that the human
rights issue is kept alive, Taiwan's concerns about reunification will not
be abated. The Beijing Massacre of June 1989 only served to exacerbate
20. This legacy includes Tibet, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.
21. The British took control over Hong Kong from China by the Treaty of Nanking in 1842,
supplemented by the Convention of Peking in 1860, and a lease was concluded in 1898 granting
Great Britain control over and use of the New Territories (adjacent to Hong Kong) for 99 years. It
generally is conceded that all of these concessions were forced upon China by a superior military
power. HONG KONG IN TRANSITION 3 (J. Cheng ed. 1986).
22. See MACAU: CITY OF COMMERCE AND CULTURE 10 (R. Cremer ed. 1987).
23. See A. BARNErr, CHINA AND THE MAJOR PowEaS IN EAST ASIA 171 (1977).
24. See Lee, One Country, Two Systems, Asian Wall St. J., May 7, 1987, at 8, col. 1.
25. See infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
26. Trade between China and Taiwan, principally through Hong Kong, reached $1.51 billion
(United States dollars) in 1987, an increase of 58.7% over their 1986 trade volume. China, Taiwan
Trade, Asian Wall St. J., Feb. 26-27, 1988, at 8, col. 2; see also Taiwan-China Trade Seen Surging
to Record in Year, Asian Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 1987, at 5, col. 1. By mid-1989 Taiwan was manifest-
ing a more relaxed attitude in general with respect to economic relations with Communist coun-
tries. See Taiwan to Expand Communist Trade, Asian Wall St. J., May 18, 1989, at 3, col. 1.
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those concerns in Taiwan.
IV. THE CHINESE REFORM MOVEMENT AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE UNITED STATES
Although Tibet itself has very little commercial contact with the
outside world, China has pursued an aggressive "open" policy since
1978, encouraging tourism as well as trade and investment relations
with the United States and other Western nations. Economically, the
policy has been highly successful for both China and the United States.
By 1987 the United States was second only to Hong Kong in direct
investment in China and was China's third largest trading partner be-
hind Hong Kong and Japan.17 Strategically, the new United States-
China rapprochement has been one of the greatest successes in contem-
porary United States foreign relations.
The sudden shift of Chinese policy, from one of isolationism and
extreme ethnocentrism to open economic relations with the Western
world and more conciliatory foreign relations, generally was made possi-
ble by the modernization program of Deng Xiaoping. Mao Zedong,
China's charismatic revolutionary leader, "liberated" China in 1949 and
subsequently led it for almost three decades on a sometimes tortured
path of increasingly leftist political extremism. The notorious decade of
virtual anarchy known as the "Cultural Revolution" (1966-1976) started
by Mao to suppress his political opponents, spread havoc, death, and
destruction throughout all of China and Tibet."8 The present govern-
ment led by Deng Xiaoping denounced the extreme leftism of the Cul-
tural Revolution soon after Deng assumed power. Four of the principal
leaders of the Cultural Revolution, the notorious "Gang of Four" in-
cluding Mao's widow, were tried for their crimes soon after Mao's 1976
death; all were committed to life in prison.29 Most of the examples of
repression cited by Congress in its 1987 condemnation of China were
drawn from the pre-1976 period.30 To the extent that Congress had a
proper role in the denunciation of the Cultural Revolution, the timing
of its 1987 resolutions was late by more than a decade.
27. NAT'L COUNCIL FOR U.S.-CHINA TRADE, U.S. JOINT VENTURES IN CHINA: A PROGRESS RE-
PORT 2 (1987).
28. There are numerous accounts of the Cultural Revolution. Contemporary historian Paul
Johnson places it in historical perspective in P. JOHNSON, MODERN TIMES ch. 16 (1983). For per-
sonal accounts of the period by Chinese writers, see F. BUTTERFIELD, CHINA ALIVE IN THE BITTER
SEA (1982); NIEN CHENG, LIFE AND DEATH IN SHANGHAI (1986); SEEDS OF FIRE: CHINESE VOICES OF
CONSCIENCE (G. Barm6 & J. Minford eds. 1986). The damage caused by the wanton destruction
and the fighting in Tibet was described by one authority as "awesome." See A. GRUNFELD, supra
note 9, at 180.
29. See generally D. BONAVIA, VERDICT IN PEKING: THE TRIAL OF THE GANG OF FOUR (1984).
30. See supra note 6.
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Beginning in 1978 the new Chinese leadership instituted a series of
significant economic and legal reforms that have been accompanied by
both political and human rights reforms. Early reforms in agriculture
were the linchpin of China's economic recovery,$' and subsequent liber-
alizations virtually have transformed the communal system of agricul-
tural production to one of private ownership. The "responsibility
system" in agriculture, which motivates workers by combining individ-
ual or group responsibility with greater opportunities for material re-
wards, proved to be so successful that it had been adopted by more
than ninety-seven percent of agricultural accounting units by 1982.2
Much of China's agricultural production today is accomplished through
"household contract" arrangements between the state and families, an
outgrowth of the responsibility system. Land is leased to an individual
or household that assumes full responsibility for production, including
risks of loss and prospects of gain. The lessee pays taxes and a land use
fee but keeps profits from sale of the produce."
Similar contract responsibility systems now are being introduced in
Chinese enterprises to inspire greater productivity from a work force
grown lethargic under the Communist system.3 4 Labor law reforms have
been extensive during the past decade as part of China's effort to in-
crease productivity. The movement from reliance upon ideological ap-
peals to motivate the workers to a system of material incentives has
resulted in the reversal of many of Mao Zedong's extreme leftist
policies. 5
The United States-China relationship has experienced a virtual 180
degree turn during the past decade. Following President Richard
Nixon's historic visit to China in 1972, Deng Xiaoping visited the
31. The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party met in 1978 and identified agricultural reform as a major priority. Determined to over-
come the disincentives for individual initiative that were inherent in Mao Zedong's collectivization
of agriculture, the Committee gave authorization for the establishment of the new "responsibility
system," which shifted responsibility for tasks or production to individuals or groups, accompanied
by prospects for greater rewards if productivity was high. See generally Vause & Vrionis, China's
Labor Reform Challenge: Motivation of the Productive Forces, 24 STAN. J. INT'L L. 447, 451-57
(1988).
32. WANG GUICHEN & ZHOU QIREN, SMASHING THE COMMUNAL POT'. FORMULATION AND DEVEL-
OPMENT OF CHINA'S RURAL RESPONSIBILITY SYSTEM 46 (1985).
33. See generally A. KHAN & E. LEE, AGRARIAN POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN CHINA AFTER
MAO (1983). The percentage of average annual income of peasants derived from household con-
tracts grew from 32.7% of total income in 1980 to 81.1% in 1985. 1986 CHINA AGRIC. Y.B. (Agricul-
tural Publishing House) 289 (English trans.).
34. See Li Dewei, Jiang Jinyong & Gai Jianling, New Trend in Enterprise Reform, BEIJING
REV., Apr. 4-10, 1988, at 23; Zhou Xiaochuan, Contract System in China's Enterprises, BEIJING
REV., Apr. 4-10, 1988, at 22.
35. See generally Vause & Vrionis, supra note 31.
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United States in 1979.36 President Jimmy Carter increased the momen-
tum towards favorable relations by signing the Agreement on Trade Re-
lations Between the United States of America and the People's
Republic of China in 1979. The successful economic relations that
subsequently developed between the United States and China encom-
passed both trade and investment. By 1987 trade between the United
States and China reached ten billion dollars, an increase of twenty per-
cent over 1986.38 Although there have been some problems and neces-
sary adjustments as the relationship has developed, 9 the trade
relationship has been regularized and was expected to grow.40 For ex-
ample, a new four-year United States-China textile agreement signed in
February 1988 further regularized the growing trade in the area of tex-
tile imports from China, a politically sensitive area for some members
of Congress.4' At the time of this writing, the full effects of the Beijing
Massacre and subsequent repression on United States-China trade are
uncertain.
Foreign investment has been embraced enthusiastically by China to
infuse needed foreign exchange into the nation's economy. In 1979
China passed an Equity Joint Venture Law42 which allowed foreign
firms to have significant ownership interests in Chinese enterprises.
American firms have been among the largest investors.43 More recently
China passed the Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law44 which allows
36. See generally [DJeng's Great Leap Outward, TIME, Feb. 5, 1979, at 24.
37. Agreement on Trade Relations, July 7, 1979, United States-People's Republic of China,
31 U.S.T. 4651, T.I.A.S. No. 9630.
38. Yeutter Expected to Urge China to Open Markets Wider to U.S., Asian Wall St. J., Feb.
1, 1988, at 1, col. 4.
39. Protectionist forces in the United States have strengthened because of the United States
trade deficit in the relationship. See Level of Trade Rises Between U.S., China, Asian Wall St. J.,
Jan. 28, 1988, at 3, col. 1. Other problems include China's concerns over United States limitations
on export of sophisticated technology. Yeutter Expected to Urge China to Open Markets Wider to
U.S., supra note 38, at 8, col. 5.
40. Expected Rise in Trade with U.S. Underlines China's Growing Role, Asian Wall St. J.,
Dec. 18-19, 1987, at 5, col. 4.
41. See China and U.S. Sign Textile Agreement That Limits Exports, Asian Wall St. J.,
Feb. 3, 1988, at 3, col. 1; see also China, U.S. Starting Talks in Washington on Textile Imports,
Asian Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1987, at 12, col. 6.
42. Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures
(adopted at the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on July 1, 1979, promul-
gated by Order No. 7 of the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Con-
gress, and effective as of July 8, 1979), English translation in 1 LAws 1979-1982, supra note 14, at
150.
43. Weil, China Market Still Attracting U.S. Firms, Asian Wall St. J., Feb. 12-13, 1988, at 8,
col. 1.
44. Law of the People's Republic of China on Foreign-Capital Enterprises (adopted at the
Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's Congress, promulgated by Order No. 39 of the Presi-
dent of the People's Republic of China, and effective on Apr. 12, 1986), English translation in 2
LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1983-1986) 254 (1987) [hereinafter LAWS 1983-1986].
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foreign investors to own one hundred percent of a business within
China's borders and a law authorizing Chinese-foreign contractual joint
ventures.45
Economic reforms have not been restricted to the arena of foreign
business. They also have changed the way Chinese do business on the
domestic front and the relationship between the state and the people.
As a generalization, the Deng Administration has sought to retract the
state's role as paternalistic provider of all the people's needs while
shifting responsibility and granting material incentives to individuals.
For example, Mao Zedong's "iron rice bowl" system, which guaranteed
lifetime employment to every individual regardless of performance, re-
sulted in bloated and notoriously inefficient and unproductive state en-
terprises.46 Few real options existed because the state made all
education and job assignments and kept labor mobility minimal. Start-
ing one's own business was "bourgeois" and out of the question."'
In 1986 new regulations instituted a "labor contract" 4" system
whereby newly hired employees in state enterprises enjoy job security
only for the contractual term of employment. Employees have new free-
dom to seek more remunerative work, for example, in foreign joint ven-
tures, at the end of the contract term. Additional regulations were
designed to tighten discipline in state enterprises.49 Moreover, the gov-
ernment now officially encourages individuals and groups to start their
own businesses in the cities and rural townships. Private farmers' mar-
kets are flourishing, and a whole new set of societal norms have been
introduced which place value on individual entrepreneurship." By 1987
private businesses were sanctioned specifically,5' and provisional regula-
tions on private enterprises went into effect in 1988.52 In 1989 bold pro-
45. Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures
(adopted at the First Session of the Seventh National People's Congress on Apr. 13, 1980), English
translation in BEIJING REV., June 20-26, 1988, at 29.
46. See J. PRYBYLA, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: PROBLEMS & POLICIES 132, 173 (2d ed. 1981).
47. Mao's emphasis upon collective economic activities allowed little room for individual en-
terprise, however small. Peasant households sometimes were allowed to engage in sideline activities
like chicken raising and handicrafts, and the cultivation of small private farm plots, but even these
were considered the "tails of capitalism" to be "cut off" during the Cultural Revolution. L. PAN,
THE NEw CHINESE REVOLUTION 22 (1987).
48. Interim Regulations on Labor Contracts in State-Owned Enterprises, July 12, 1986, pub-
lished in Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), Sept. 10, 1986, at 2, col. 1.
49. Provisional Regulations of the State Council Governing the Dismissal of Undisciplined
Staff Members and Workers by State-Owned Enterprises, July 12, 1986, published in Renmin
Ribao (People's Daily), Sept. 10, 1986, at 2, col. 1.
50. See generally 0. SCHELL, To GET RICH Is GLORIOUS: CHINA IN THE EIGHTIES (1984).
51. Regulation Issued to Supervise Private Businesses, China Daily, Aug. 19, 1987, at 1, col.
1.
52. Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China Concerning Private Enter-
prises (promulgated by the State Council on June 25, 1988, and effective on July 1, 1988), English
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posals to end state ownership were being debated openly by leading
Chinese economists.5
The Chinese economic system appears to have been undergoing a
fundamental restructuring, adopting many features of a private sector,
free market economy. The favorable developments on China's economic
front have been accompanied by legal reforms aimed at improving
human rights protections. In part because of the new importance of its
place on the world stage, China formally has recognized certain basic
freedoms of Chinese citizens.
The 1982 Constitution contains a number of significant promises.
Chapter II is devoted to fundamental rights and duties of citizens and
includes guarantees of freedoms of religious belief,54 speech, press, as-
sembly, association, procession, and demonstration.55 The Constitution
also declares that the "[f]reedom of the person of citizens of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China is inviolable," and provides safeguards for
proper arrests and prohibitions against unlawful detentions or searches
of persons 56 and searches of residences. 5 7 The Constitution guarantees
freedom and privacy of correspondence, 58 and the right of citizens to
criticize and make suggestions regarding any state organ or
functionary.
5 9
Many of China's contemporary leaders, including Deng Xiaoping,
personally endured great hardship and suffering during the Cultural
Revolution; the Constitution reflects a commitment to avoid such harsh
abuses of power that were perpetrated by the leadership on the Chinese
people in the past.60 Under its present leadership modern China already
had remedied many of the more serious abuses of its recent past by the
time the controversial congressional resolution on the "Tibet Question"
was promulgated in 1987.1
The Chinese are extremely sensitive about the world's perception
translation in East Asian Exec. Rep., Oct. 15, 1988, at 24.
53. Kristof, In Beijing, a Bold New Proposal: End State Ownership of Industry, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 10, 1989, at Al, col. 4.
54. 1982 CONST., supra note 14, arts. 34, 36, English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-1982, supra
note 14, at 12.
55. Id. art. 35, English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-1982, supra note 14, at 12.
56. Id. art. 37, English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-1982, supra note 14, at 12.
57. Id. art. 39, English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-1982, supra note 14, at 13.
58. Id. art. 40, English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-1982, supra note 14, at 13.
59. Id. art. 41, English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-1982, supra note 14, at 13.
60. For example, article 38 states that "[ihe personal dignity of citizens of the People's Re-
public of China is inviolable. Insult, libel, false accusation or false incrimination directed against
citizens by any means is prohibited." Id. art. 38, English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-1982, supra
note 14, at 12-13. The language of this article addresses precisely the kind of abuses fostered by
the Red Guards during the decade prior to Mao's death.
61. See supra note 6.
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of their actions in Tibet. As a minority population in the Tibet Autono-
mous Region, the backward Tibetans obviously are helpless in the
hands of the well-armed Chinese. The Deng regime has recognized the
important role of national ethnic minorities in China's unification
movement. The preamble to the 1982 Constitution states that "China is
a unitary multi-national state created jointly by the people of all its
nationalities. '62 Equal treatment of all nationalities is guaranteed, and
the state is pledged to assist minority nationality areas in their eco-
nomic and cultural development.6 3 Discrimination against or oppression
of any nationality is prohibited expressly.6 4 Placed in the context of
China's move to unify traditionally Chinese areas, its treatment of mi-
norities assumes particular importance. Taiwan is considered part of
the "sacred territory" of China, and the Constitution states that it is
the inviolable duty of all Chinese people to accomplish the task of re-
unifying Taiwan with the Chinese motherland. 5
These developments are not only advantageous to the United
States from an economic perspective but also hold great potential for
strategic advantage. Particularly after the ignominious withdrawal of
United States forces from Vietnam, the Pacific Ocean no longer can be
claimed as the "American Sea." The Soviet Union gained its only warm
water port to the Pacific through a 1978 defense pact with Vietnam,
which gave it access to Cam Ranh Bay, and has proceeded to expand its
Pacific presence. 6 With American influence in the region under chal-
lenge from many directions, the continuing risks of losing Clark Air
Force Base and Subic Naval Base in the Philippines pose major strate-
gic challenges for the United States presence in the eastern Pacific re-
gion. A friendly and supportive relationship with China, which borders
Russia along thousands of miles of common frontier, obviously augers
well for the United States.
However, the warming of the United States-China relationship over
the past decade has not occurred without legal, economic, and political
problems. In spite of its ambitious drive to develop a modern, more
Western legal system that will provide a receptive and secure environ-
ment for Western investment, the bureaucratic inertia of the Chinese
system has created many problems for Western investors and potential
trading partners. The Western business press has appeared preoccupied
during recent years with the problems of United States investments in
62. 1982 CONST., supra note 14, preamble, English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-1982, supra
note 14, at 4.
63. Id. art. 4, English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-1982, supra note 14, at 6.
64. Id.
65. Id. preamble, English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-1982, supra note 14, at 4.
66. The Russians Are Landing, ECONOMIST, Apr. 28, 1984, at 57.
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China. Trade between the two nations, while growing, also has been
attended by other nagging problems such as protectionist concerns in
the United States over cheap textile imports from China, United States
barriers to the export of high technology to China, and concerns over
the use of Chinese-built Silkworm missiles by Iran in the Persian
Gulf.
68
Individually and cumulatively, these problems should not threaten
the fundamental viability of the United States-China relationship.
While such problems arise primarily from commercial practices and can
be solved with commercial solutions, the "Tibet Question" raised by
Congress is potentially more serious because it raises political issues
that cut to the very heart of deeply held convictions of both the Chi-
nese and the Americans. It also illustrates the indissoluble linkage be-
tween presidential foreign relations powers and congressional foreign
relations powers, and provides a contemporary case study of the frus-
tration of United States interests when those powers are not exercised
in concert.
V. THE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON THE "TIBET QUESTION" AND ITS
EFFECT ON RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA
In spite of its historical obscurity, Tibet has been the subject of
much recent political notoriety, highlighted by violent anti-Chinese
demonstrations in its capital city, Lhasa, beginning in the fall of 1987.
Concern in the American Congress about the human rights situation in
Tibet had been building for months before the demonstrations began.
From the Chinese perspective, a combination of congressional meddling
in China's domestic affairs and anti-Chinese propaganda by the Dalai
Lama precipitated the violence in Lhasa. On June 18, 1987, the United
States House of Representatives debated amendments to the appropri-
ations bill, House Bill 1777, for the fiscal years 1988 and 1989.69 The
amendment, introduced by Congressman Daniel Mica, charged the Chi-
nese with continued human rights abuses in Tibet, commended the Da-
lai Lama for his efforts to secure peace and religious freedom in Tibet,
and reiterated the 1985 request made to China by ninety-one members
67. See, e.g., China's Economic Reforms Don't Impress Foreigners, Asian Wall St. J., July
27, 1987, at 3, col. 1.
68. The possible Chinese military application of Western technology continues to concern
United States policy makers. Although the prospects for increased military exchanges between the
two countries have been explored, recent incidents such as use of China's Silkworm missile by Iran
have exacerbated sore points in the United States-China relationship. Related concerns surfaced
again in spring 1989 when it was disclosed that Iran was building a missile plant and continuing to
develop its chemical warfare capability with China's assistance. See China Helping Iran to Build
Missile Factory, Asian Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1989, at 3, col. 3.
69. See 133 CONG. REc. H5217-30 (daily ed. June 18, 1987).
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of Congress that China conduct direct talks with the Dalai Lama and
the Tibetans in exile. 0 This amendment was passed with the compan-
ion House amendment that condemned China generally for its failure
to grant adequate religious freedoms. 1 The support in Congress that
led to passage of the amendments was generated in part through the
lobbying efforts of Tibetan centers in the United States. 2
The House action stung the tourist-hungry Chinese who need the
continuing influx of foreign currency into Tibet and China to fuel
China's aggressive program of modernization. Chinese resentment of
the congressional action was widespread among the general populace 3
as well as among official government and Party spokespersons.74 Con-
gressman Mica's amendment to House Bill 1777 called upon the Presi-
dent of the United States to instruct United States officials, including
ambassadors to China and India, "to pay greater attention to the con-
cerns of the Tibetan people and to work closely with all concerned
about human rights violations in Tibet." 5 The stage was set for conflict
between the political aspirations of Congress and the executive branch
policies pursued for more than fifteen years to develop a rapprochement
with China.
On September 21, 1987, the Dalai Lama made an unprecedented
appearance before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus and
presented a five point plan designed to transform Tibet into a "zone of
peace and non-violence. 1 6 The plan was presented to the House of
Representatives and read into the record by Congressman Tom Lantos
70. Ninety-one members of Congress signed a letter to China's President Li Xiannian on
July 24, 1988, which contained the request. Id. at H5219.
71. Id. at H5231.
72. Tiny Group of Tibetans Raises Loud Voice of Conscience, INSIGHT, Apr. 25, 1988, at 18.
The "Office of Tibet," the unofficial consulate of the Dalai Lama's government-in-exile, is a
"grapevine federation" of 15 regional offices throughout the United States devoted to calling atten-
tion to the political aims of Tibet's exile community. Although there were only about 500 Tibetans
in the United States by 1988, there are 250 Tibetan centers nationwide, most of them built since
1970 to accommodate growing interest in Tibetan culture, specifically in Tibetan Buddhism. Id.
73. The Author was in China when the controversial amendment was addressed by the
House of Representatives, and bases his conclusions on Chinese reactions in the Chinese press as
well as numerous interviews with Chinese students, intellectuals, and others.
74. Officially recognized "Tibetan leaders," who generally are viewed as subservient to the
Chinese power structure, also joined the chorus against the United States Congress and the Dalai
Lama. See, e.g., Panchen Lama on "Tibetan Independence," CHINA RECONSTRUCTS, Jan. 1988, at
8; Tibetan Leaders on the Tibet Situation, BEIJING REv., Apr. 18-24, 1988, at 18.
75. 133 CONG. REC. H5219 (daily ed. June 18, 1987).
76. See Roy, supra note 7, at 50. Before his September 1987 visit to the United States, the
Dalai Lama had visited the United States on three previous occasions during which he had not
engaged in any activities other than those expected from his status as a respected religious leader.
The United States visa for his September 1987 visit was granted to him only in his capacity as a




on the next day as a "political statement" by the Dalai Lama as "politi-
cal leader of the Tibetan people" from his government-in-exile.7 7 The
Dalai Lama's peace plan contained the following five basic components:
(1) transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace; (2) aban-
donment of China's population transfer policy; (3) respect for the Ti-
betan people's fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms;
(4) restoration and protection of Tibet's natural environment and the
abandonment of China's use of Tibet for the production of nuclear
weapons and dumping of nuclear waste; and (5) commencement of ear-
nest negotiations on the future status of Tibet and of relations between
the Tibetan and Chinese peoples.
78
The United States House of Representatives also passed a resolu-
tion in which the Senate concurred on September 22, 1987, welcoming
the Dalai Lama on the occasion of his visit to the United States, and
commending him "for furthering the just and honorable causes that he
has championed."7 9 His principal cause, of course, always had been to
have the Chinese totally removed or withdrawn from Tibet.
As a prelude to the Dalai Lama's appearance, the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on Human Rights had heard testimony on the
Tibetan situation on September 17, 1987.80 Appearing before the Sub-
committee were Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Stapleton Roy, the
executive director of Amnesty International, and four other experts on
the Tibetan situation. Based on that testimony, Senator Claiborne Pell
reported to the Senate that the human rights situation had improved
along with the economy under the administration of Deng Xiaoping.
Nevertheless, it was noted that some human rights abuses were contin-
uing, specifically in the detention and abuse of political prisoners in
Tibet. 1
The new trends in Chinese policy towards Tibet were documented
in a special report on the treatment of minorities in China prepared by
the Department of State at the request of the Subcommittee on Human
Rights and submitted to the Subcommittee on October 1, 1987.82 The
report concluded that important aspects of Chinese policy toward Tibet
improved after 1980, but that problems remain and the current situa-
tion is not as favorable as the Chinese would have Americans believe.83
77. Proposal for Peace and Accommodation in Tibet-Statement of the Dalai Lama, 133
CONG. REC. E3641 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1987).
78. Id. at E3642.
79. H.R. Con. Res. 191, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CoNG. REC. H7745 (daily ed. Sept. 22,
1987).
80. See 133 CONG. REC. S12,496 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1987) (remarks of Sen. Claiborne Pell).
81. See id.




In his statement, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Roy observed
that the Dalai Lama was granted a United States visa for his current
visit solely in his capacity as a religious leader, "since the United States
Government considers Tibet to be a part of China and does not in any
way recognize the Tibetan government in exile that the Dalai Lama
claims to head. '84 The Chinese Minister of Justice issued a protest
against the Dalai Lama's remarks and those of "some United States
Congressmen" who had spoken on the issue, characterizing their state-
ments as "sinister slander."8 5
On September 27, 1987, within days of the Dalai Lama's appear-
ance before the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, a separatist dem-
onstration was held at Tibetan Buddhism's most holy site, the Jokhang
Temple in Lhasa. Tibetan Buddhist monks impatient for the return of
the Dalai Lama and restive under Chinese domination led the move-
ment. 6 On September 30 Congressman Lantos reported to the press
information he had received that the Chinese government had executed
at least two Tibetan nationalists as a political message in reprisal for
the speeches given by the Dalai Lama during his visit to the United
States.s1 Congressman Lantos attributed the report "to a translation of
Radio Lhasa made by Tibetan exiles in India, who monitor the state-
controlled radio broadcasts." Representatives of the Dalai Lama in New
York provided the transcript to Lantos. The Chinese Embassy in Wash-
ington denied the allegations.8"
October 7, 1987, marked the thirty-seventh anniversary of the Chi-
nese Army's invasion of Tibet, but the attitude of Tibetans was not
celebratory. On October 1 violence had erupted in Lhasa, leaving at
least six persons dead, many arrested, and considerable property dam-
aged. 9 According to Chinese sources, about fifty foreign tourists and
nationals were seen among the rioters 0 Two Americans who were pre-
sent in Lhasa during the riots were ordered out of Tibet.91 The Chinese
response was swift and certain. Beijing issued one of its harshest at-
84. U.S. Can Not Support Dalai Lama Programme, China Daily, Oct. 17, 1987, at 1, col. 7.
Roy further stated the Administration's position that when the Dalai Lama "assumes a political
status and advances a political programme for Tibet, which we consider to be part of China, the
United States Government cannot support him." Id.
85. Accusations by Dalai Lama False, China Daily, Oct. 1, 1987, at 1, col. 3.
86. Chinese Report Protest by Lamas to Free Tibet, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1987, at A8, col. 3.
87. Executions Are Claimed, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1987, at AS, col. 4.
88. Id.
89. See Tibetan Protest for Independence Becomes Violent, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1987, at Al,
col. 6.
90. Foreigners Found in Lhasa Violence, China Daily, Oct. 12, 1987, at 3, col. 1.
91. 2 American Mountaineers Tell of Witnessing Tibet Protests, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1987,
at A6, col. 1.
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tacks on the Dalai Lama, whom it blamed for inciting the riot, 2 and
immediately dispatched additional security forces to Lhasa.93 Tele-
phone and telex communications were interrupted within days of the
October riots, and Tibet virtually was sealed off from the outside
world.94 A curfew was imposed, 9 foreign journalists were barred from
reporting in Lhasa9 after additional demonstrations occurred on the
sixth of October,97 and Western reporters subsequently were expelled.98
On October 7 the Dalai Lama held a press conference at his headquar-
ters near Dharamasala, India, and urged his supporters to continue pro-
testing Chinese rule but to do so peacefully.99 Chinese criticism,
provoked by the Dalai Lama's press conference, resulted in a reaffirma-
tion by Indian government spokesmen that Tibet is considered part of
China and that the Dalai Lama should limit his activities to nonpoliti-
cal matters. 100 By mid-October the Chinese government imposed a tem-
porary ban on all foreign visitors to Tibet'01 and set deadlines for the
surrender of separatist protesters.
Congress and the executive branch were divided sharply in their
reactions to the Chinese crackdown. On October 6, 1987, the Reagan
Administration voiced support for China's position in controlling the
unrest in Lhasa.102 On the same day the United States Senate voted
unanimously to condemn China for its response to the demonstrations
and urged the President to meet with the Dalai Lama. The resolution
also threatened to link future American arms sales to China to improve-
ment in China's human rights record. 0 3 This movement in the Senate
was led by a coalition of Democrats who promoted human rights and
92. China Blames Tibetan Leader for Violent Protest, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1987, § 1, at 16,
col. 1.
93. Chinese Police Take Over Section of Holiest Buddhist Site in Tibet, N.Y. Times, Oct.
6, 1987, at Al, col. 1; Chinese Move to Quell Tibet Demonstrations, Asian Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1987,
at 1, col. 3.
94. Communications to Tibet Curbed and Foreigners Are Banned, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8,
1987, at A8, col. 5.
95. Chinese Curfew in the Tibet Capital, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1987, at A6, col. 1.
96. Beijing Barring Journalists from Reporting in Lhasa, Asian Wall St. J., Oct. 9-10, 1987,
at 8, col. 1.
97. On October 6, 1987, about 60 people were arrested in Lhasa when they marched on
government offices. 60 Shout Out Dalai Lama's Name and Are Seized in Protest in Tibet, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 7, 1987, at A8, col. 1.
98. China Expels Western Reporters in Tibet, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1987, at A3, col. 4.
99. Dalai Lama Urges Peaceful Protest Against China, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1987, at A8, col.
3.
100. In Tibet's Dark Hour, Dalai Lama Is Their Refuge, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1988, at A4, col.
3.
101. Government Restricts Tibet Visits, China Daily, Oct. 15, 1987, at 1, col. 1.





Republican conservatives who supported Taiwan.'04 Congressman
Lantos advanced a plan that would give the Dalai Lama's government-
in-exile observer status at the United Nations, similar to the status en-
joyed by the Palestine Liberation Organization.0 5 On the day of the
Senate condemnation of China, protests were renewed in Lhasa, and
sixty people who marched to a government office in the capital city
were arrested.
0 6
State Department officials assailed the Senate action and predicted
that it was almost certain to damage United States-China ties. 0 7 The
State Department reaffirmed the position that Tibet is a part of China
and that the Dalai Lama is a religious leader only, not the head of a
Tibetan government-in-exile.' 0 8 This position of moderation subjected
the State Department to immediate and continuing criticism by the
press. 0 9 In response to sharp criticism from Congress, Stapleton Roy
defended the Administration's position before a joint hearing of two
subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on October 14,
1987. He cautioned that a distinction should be made between expres-
sion of concern over human rights and interference in Chinese domestic
affairs." 0 Roy explained that the Administration agreed with the Dalai
Lama with respect to the need for preservation of fundamental human
rights in Tibet, and for freedom of Tibetan people to develop and to
exercise basic democratic freedoms, but could not support him "when
he assumes a political status and advances a political program for Ti-
bet, which we consider to be part of China."'
104. Fire at the Top of the World, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 19, 1987, at 50.
105. U.S. Official Defends Stance on Turmoil in Tibet, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1987, at A18,
col. 1.
106. 60 Shout Out Dalai Lama's Name and Are Seized in Protest in Tibet, supra note 97.
The Chinese code of criminal procedure specifically prohibits the use of torture. See Criminal
Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, art. 32 (adopted at the Second Session of the
Fifth National People's Congress on July 1, 1979, promulgated by Order No. 6 of the Chairman of
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on July 7, 1979, and effective as of Jan.
1, 1980), English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-1982, supra note 14, at 120, 126. However, the United
States State Department has reported that public security personnel sometimes use harsh treat-
ment at the time of detention of suspects, and that a number of reliable sources reported that
People's Armed Police severely beat several monks who were detained during the demonstrations
in Lhasa on October 6, 1987. See COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1987: RE-
PORT SUBMITTED TO THE HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS BY THE DEP'T OF STATE, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 662 (Joint Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter
1987 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT].
107. Beijing Is Backed by Administration on Unrest in Tibet, supra note 102.
108. Id. The United States has recognized the sovereignty of China over Tibet since the
1940s; since 1978, the United States has recognized Tibet only as part of China. Id. at A9, col. 1.
109. See, e.g., Rosenthal, Selling Out Tibet, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1988, at A31, col. 6; Stand
Up for Decency in Tibet, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1987, at A38, col. 1.
110. U.S. Official Defends Stance on Turmoil in Tibet, supra note 105.
111. Roy, supra note 7, at 51.
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Unsettled by the congressional offensive in setting United States
foreign policy, senior State Department officials engaged in serious dis-
cussions during mid-October to reassess the Department's position on
Tibet. The principal objective seemed to be the identification of more
effective ways for the Department to express displeasure over alleged
human rights abuses in ways that would not offend China unnecessarily
and that would assure it that the United States has no intention of
upsetting China's security arrangements on its border." 2
Chinese sources promptly denounced the Senate action and ex-
pressed "strong indignation."' 3 On October 16, 1987, Deng Xiaoping
verbally lashed out at several members of Congress for their continued
provocative statements on Tibet and for the recent disturbances there.
Although he affirmed that the Tibetan situation would not affect the
"overall good situation" between the United States and China, he did
express concern over the "ignorance and arrogance" of the members of
Congress concerned.1 14 On the same day the Chinese government de-
nied permission to a delegation of members of Congress headed by Rep-
resentative Lantos to visit Tibet."5 By early 1988 an uneasy peace had
been restored to Lhasa, but it remained clouded by serious unresolved
questions about Tibet's past, present, and future." 6
By late 1987 the highly publicized debate over the "Tibet Ques-
tion" ensured that any position taken on amending House Bill 1777" 7
would be interpreted as either favoring or opposing human rights. Amid
such controversy it virtually was a foregone conclusion that Congress's
condemnation of China would become part of the national laws. On De-
cember 22, 1987, Congress passed the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act for fiscal years 1988 and 1989.118 Section 1243 condemned China for
alleged violations of human rights in Tibet and announced a congres-
sional policy that "the United States should make the treatment of the
Tibetan people an important factor in its conduct of relations with the
People's Republic of China." 1 9 Similar condemnations were made in
section 1245 for other alleged abuses in China. 120 One interpretation of
112. U.S. Is Reassessing Response on Tibet, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1987, § 1, at 17, col. 1.
113. See U.S. Amendment on Tibet "a Farce," China Daily, Oct. 17, 1987, at 4, col. 3.
114. Chinese Leader Faults U.S. Lawmakers on Tibet, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1987, at 32, col.
1.
115. Id.
116. Chinese Established a Truce, Though Shaky, in Tibet, St. Petersburg Times, Feb. 5,
1988, at A16, col. 1.
117. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
118. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-204,
100 Stat. 1331 (codified in part in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
119. Id. § 1243(b)(2), 100 Stat. at 1423.
120. Id. § 1245, 100 Stat. at 1425-26.
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this series of events, clearly implied by congressional treatment of the
Dalai Lama, is that Congress regarded Tibet as a sovereign nation enti-
tled to independence from China, with the Dalai Lama as the political
head of that nation.
Other events strained United States-China relations in 1988. In
January it was disclosed that Defense Department officials soon would
add China to a public list of nations designated as hostile to the United
States. The list applies only to the Defense Department and is pub-
lished under a Pentagon regulation that forbids the issuance of security
clearances to naturalized citizens from "hostile" nations until they have
been American citizens for five years. 2' The decision to add China to
the list was made after a review following the Reagan Administration's
concerns over the use of Chinese-made Silkworm missiles by Iran in the
Persian Gulf.
2 2
By mid-February 1988 a Chinese official described United States-
China relations as "potentially unstable," and attacked what he charac-
terized as interference in China's internal affairs. Congressional criti-
cism of China's handling of the Tibet situation and congressional
allegations of human rights abuses in China were among the principal
problems cited in the climate of worsening relations. 23 By early March
of 1988, however, the Reagan Administration was reported to have been
considering relaxation of restrictions on high technology exports to
China because it had been determined that China no longer sold Silk-
worm missiles to Iran.
24
After the October 1987 turmoil in Lhasa had subsided, Chinese au-
thorities began a series of initiatives to reduce tensions in Tibet. An
extensive political indoctrination campaign was conducted in major
Buddhist monasteries in an effort to persuade Tibetans of the futility
and illegality of calling for independence. 25 Improvements in Tibetan
living conditions under Chinese rule were highlighted both in such
meetings and in the Chinese press. The Panchen Lama, who ranked
second to the Dalai Lama as Tibet's spiritual leader, but lived in Beij-
ing and served in an official role recognized by the Chinese government,
121. Secret Is Out on Listing China as Hostile Country, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1988, at A20,
col. 1.
122. Id.
123. The other four problems cited were: (1) American sanctions for what the Reagan Ad-
ministration has charged were Chinese arms sales to Iran; (2) Washington's continued arms sales
to Taiwan; (3) the Administration's continuing criticism of China's family planning program; and
(4) United States impatience with the pace of China's opening to the outside world. Chinese Offi-
cial Lists 6 Grievances Against U.S., N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1988, at A3, col. 1.
124. U.S. Informs China High-Tech Exports Could Be Widened, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1988,
at Al, col. 1.
125. Tibet Unrest: Fears Return, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1988, at A7, col. 1.
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visited Lhasa in January of 1988 in an effort to conciliate Tibetans.
The Chinese displays of tolerance failed to control the tension, and
the short-lived peace disintegrated. On March 5, 1988, Tibetan mobs
again took to the streets in Lhasa, reportedly killing three Chinese po-
licemen; the police killed at least five Tibetans as rioting ravaged the
city.126 The rioting came at the close of the week-long Great Prayer Fes-
tival, which had been opened to foreign journalists. Tibetans reportedly
were concerned that the Chinese used the festival as a showcase for
foreigners to display the relative calm that existed in Lhasa.12 7
The rioting could not have been timed better to embarrass Chinese
officials and to place additional strains on the United States-China rela-
tionship. The riots broke out on the eve of the arrival of the Chinese
foreign minister, Wu Xueqian, in Washington for meetings with Ameri-
can officials to discuss problems that recently had surfaced in United
States-China relations, including the congressional allegations of human
rights abuses in Tibet.12 8 Many officials in China blamed the resurgence
of riots on too much Chinese leniency, and hardliners briefly appeared
to be in the ascendancy. In response to the March rioting, the Panchen
Lama called for heavy punishment of the rioters and warned Tibetans
that they should not misinterpret Chinese "leniency and forbearance as
signs of weakness."' 29 Strict limits on tourism to Tibet continued to be
imposed after the renewed rioting in March 1988.130
In early April, however, China again reverted to a conciliatory ap-
proach by inviting the Dalai Lama to return to live in Tibet if he would
cease to call for Tibetan independence. 1 ' In contrast to previous Chi-
nese offers to give him a post in Beijing, this offer was the first time he
had been invited to live in Tibet.32 Although the Dalai Lama rejected
the offer, he also appeared more conciliatory in his response. 133 The Da-
lai Lama's position generally has been one of strong opposition to the
Chinese military presence in Tibet with little or no acknowledgement of
any legitimate Chinese interests in Tibet. He also has denied China's
right to handle Tibet's foreign affairs. In a dramatic shift, he reversed
both positions in a speech to a meeting of members of the European
126. Id. Unconfirmed and anonymous reports made to the New York Times by a foreigner
claimed that 18 monks died in the March rioting. New Report Says 18 Monks Died in Tibet
Protest, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1988, § 1, at 6, col. 1.
127. 3 Reported Dead in Latest Tibet Riots, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1988, at A3, col. 1.
128. See id.
129. Bad Faith at the Temple, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 21, 1988, at 40.
130. Beijing Is Said to Restrict Foreign Travel to Tibet, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1988, at A5,
col. 1.





Parliament in Strasbourg, France, on June 15, 1988.134 He recognized
China's right to handle Tibet's foreign affairs and at least temporarily
to maintain troops on Chinese soil until talks with China could be con-
summated to make Tibet "a self-governing democratic political entity"
associated with China." 5
By early 1989 events again soured the prospects for a meaningful
dialogue between the Dalai Lama and Beijing. In January the Panchen
Lama died. Although he was regarded as Beijing's lackey, the Panchen
Lama decried China's abuses in his Tibetan homeland before his
death. 13 6 On March 5, 1989, a small group of Buddhist monks and nuns
marched near the Jokhang Temple in Lhasa, carrying proindependence
signs. The protests quickly escalated into open clashes with the police,
and riots lasted for several days. 3 ' The outbursts left as many as thirty
persons dead, and martial law was imposed by Chinese authorities.'38
By March 10, 1989, the thirtieth anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan upris-
ing against Chinese domination, Tibet's capital city was marked by rel-
ative calm only because of a military clampdown."3 9
Congress has a legitimate concern over the human rights records of
other countries, particularly those with whom the United States has ec-
onomic and other special relationships. Congress premised its involve-
ment in the above scenario on its concern with China's human rights
record generally and specifically with respect to Tibet. Those original
concerns of the House of Representatives'4 0 may be categorized into six
different areas: (1) Chinese dominion over Tibet; (2) the abuses perpe-
trated upon Tibet and Tibetans during the Cultural Revolution;
(3) poor living conditions in Tibet; (4) the influx of Chinese into Tibet;
(5) reports by Amnesty International of current human rights abuses of
Tibetans for the nonviolent expression of religious and political beliefs;
and (6) the failure of the Deng government to respond to the 1985 let-
ter signed by ninety-one members of Congress calling for direct talks
between China and the Dalai Lama."" To evaluate these concerns in
the context of the above events, it is useful first to review the human
rights situation in China and particularly China's position on issues of
critical concern to the Tibetans, such as freedom of religion. A complete
134. Dalai Lama Approves Chinese Role in Tibet, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1988, at A7, col. 1.
135. Id.
136. McGurn, Dalai Lama Seeks Middle Way on Tibet, Wall Street J., Mar. 8, 1989, at A14,
col. 3.
137. Chinese Declare Martial Law in Lhasa, Asian Wall St. J., Mar. 8, 1989, at 3, col. 4.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See 133 CONG. REC. H5219 (daily ed. June 18, 1987) (setting forth congressional findings




analysis of the subject of human rights in China is beyond the scope of
this Article, but the following highlights describe the situation that pre-
vailed in China, including Tibet, when the controversial amendments to
House Bill 1777 were introduced and debated.
VI. THE CHINESE RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS
When the United States formally recognized China in 1979 and en-
ded the decades of United States-China estrangement, China was ruled
by an authoritarian government dominated by a privileged elite that
exercised control through a one party system. That situation has not
changed to this day. China continues to be ruled by a small group of
leaders who dominate several key organizations, including the Politburo
and its five-member standing committee, the Military Commission, and
the Secretariat. All share power within the overall dominance of the
Chinese Communist Party. Deng Xiaoping, who serves as Chairman of
the Party's key Central Military Commission, clearly continues to be
China's preeminent leader.142 Freedoms of speech, press, religion, and
other basic human rights continue to be circumscribed, although liber-
alizations have occurred in recent years.143
Congressional concern over the Cultural Revolution as expressed in
the amendments to House Bill 1777 certainly was valid. The Tibet Au-
tonomous Region was hit particularly hard by the Cultural Revolution.
Mao's "Red Guards" flooded into Lhasa in 1966, and many young
Tibetans joined them, engaging in virtually unrestrained destruction of
Tibetan history. Religious scriptures and texts were burned, and
thousands of monasteries and other historical buildings that had wit-
nessed centuries of Tibetan history were destroyed. The people were
subjugated totally, their religious and social customs banned, and even
the traditional crops of barley were changed by government decree.
Many Tibetans were subjected to public humiliation and abuse. There
is no accurate measure available for the number of lives lost. The con-
gressional amendment stated that "over one million Tibetans have per-
ished since 1949 as a direct result of political instability, imprisonment,
and widescale famine. '144 No source for this data was indicated, nor was
a more specific time period designated, but it is fair to assume that this
estimate focused primarily on the period of the Cultural Revolution.
The Tibetans did not suffer alone. The Han Chinese, the dominant
ruling group in China, likewise suffered throughout the nation from the
virtually unrestrained rampages of Mao's "Red Guards" during the Cul-
142. 1987 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 106, at 660.
143. Id.
144. 133 CONG. REc. H5219 (daily ed. June 18, 1987).
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tural Revolution. Many of the abuses of human rights during the Cul-
tural Revolution have been chronicled by Amnesty International 45 and
others.1- An initial and basic tenet announced by the post-Mao regime
in China was that those abuses should never be allowed to happen
again. One of the first reforms of the Deng government took the un-
precedented step of publicly recognizing and condemning those abuses
of the past.117 The United States State Department issued a public
statement commending China's new government for this forthright ac-
tion,148 and Congress was informed of the new government's position in
public hearings.' 49 Members of the notorious "Gang of Four," consid-
ered responsible for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, were ar-
rested, tried, and punished severely.'50
Deng stated early in his regime that "to practise people's democ-
racy to the full" was one of three major objectives of China's moderni-
zation.' 5' No one, especially the Chinese, would suggest that they aspire
to the same level of democracy that is practiced in the United States.
Moreover, it is clear that human rights do not enjoy the same protec-
tions in China as they do in the United States and most other Western
democracies. However, the trend in China for more than a decade has
been towards greater liberalization in political and religious freedoms,
and increased governmental respect for human rights generally.
One of the principal thrusts of the Deng government has been to
establish the consistent rule of law and to reduce the arbitrary rule of
men. This trend is directly contrary to the highly personalized rule of
Mao Zedong. The importance of this change may be illustrated in the
Deng regime's liberalization of religious freedoms, a subject of consider-
able relevance to the Tibetan Buddhists.
In China, as in other Communist countries, religion is considered to
be a potential competitor for the people's loyalty to the state. The ex-
treme leftism of the Cultural Revolution sought a final solution in the
145. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT; AMNESTY INT'L, 1979 ANNUAL REPORT.
146. See, e.g., R. EDWARDS, L. HENKIN & A. NATHAN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA
(1986).
147. See Human Rights in Asia: Communist Countries: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Asian and Pacific Affairs and on International Organizations of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 43, 44 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 Hearings] (statement of Charles W.
Freeman) (referring to an interview with Deng Xiaoping in which Deng admitted that over one
million persons were killed during the rise of the Gang of Four).
148. China Commended for Acknowledging Past Rights Abuses, Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 1978,
at A17, col. 1.
149. See generally 1980 Hearings, supra note 147.
150. See generally D. BONAVIA, supra note 29.
151. Reform of System of Party, State Leadership, China Daily, July 1, 1987, at 4, col. 1
(English language translation of a major speech given by Deng in 1980 to a meeting held by the
Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China).
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eradication of all religious practices. That effort was unsuccessful, and
Deng Ziaoping's reformist government initiated a policy of limited reli-
gious toleration in 1978.152 The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) convened
under Deng's leadership and became a watershed event in the economic
opening of China.15 3 The new Constitution of the People's Republic of
China, adopted on March 5, 1978, by the Fifth National People's Con-
gress, contained the following provision on religion: "Citizens enjoy
freedom to believe in religion and freedom not to believe in religion and
to propagate atheism."' 154 Although the new leadership did not abandon
the ultimate goal of weakening religion's influence, it appeared to have
reversed its position on abolishing religion, at least for the foreseeable
future.
The 1982 Constitution expanded the protections for freedom of re-
ligious belief:
Article 34.
All citizens of the People's Republic of China who have reached the age of 18
have the right to vote and stand for election, regardless of ... religious belief.
except persons deprived of political rights according to law.155
Article 36.
Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief.
No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to be-
lieve in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens
who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion.
The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion
to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or
interfere with the educational system of the state.
Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign
domination. 5"
Following the official liberalization of religious freedoms under
Deng, religion appears to have enjoyed a substantial resurgence
152. 1987 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 106, at 670.
153. See China's Developing Legal Structure for Trade and Commerce: Hearings Before the
Special Subcomm. on U.S. Trade with China of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1984) (containing materials submitted by Tao-Tai Hsia).
154. CONST. OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA [1978] art. 46 (adopted at the First Session
of the Fifth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on Mar. 5, 1978), Eng-
lish translation in 2 SELECTED DOCUMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 165 (J. Wang ed.
1979) [hereinafter SELECTED DOCUMENTS]. The 1954 Constitution stated that "[c]itizens of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief." CONST. OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA [1954] art. 88 (adopted at the First Session of the First National People's Congress of the
People's Republic of China on Sept. 20, 1954), English translation in 1 SELECTED DOCUMENTS,
supra, at 52. However, the increasingly repressive policies of Mao Zedong eviscerated the promise
of any religious freedom under the 1954 Constitution.
155. 1982 CONST., supra note 14, art. 34, English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-1982, supra
note 14, at 12.
156. Id. art. 36, English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-1982, supra note 14, at 12.
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throughout China and Tibet, particularly during the year preceding the
United States congressional resolution of June 1987.117 The number of
Chinese who practice religion reportedly has increased since 1978; offi-
cial estimates in 1987 placed the totals at three million Catholics, four
million Protestants, fifteen million Muslims, and more than ten million
Buddhists. Daoists are estimated into millions at a minimum.1 8 Many
of the religious institutions that had been closed during the Cultural
Revolution have been reopened. In 1987 there were more than 30,000
churches, temples, monasteries, and mosques in service in China. Many
of the Buddhists and Daoist temples have been reopened, often after
restoration by the Chinese government. 59 The restoration of Tibetan
monasteries also is continuing, although only a fraction of the 2700
monasteries open before the Chinese suppression of the 1959 Tibetan
uprising have been reopened. In addition to the appropriation of funds
for extensive renovations, the government provides other financial sup-
port for religious bodies, including tax exemptions and certain cash
subsidies. 60
There continues to be a pressing shortage of priests, ministers,
monks, imams, and other religious leaders because older leaders are dy-
ing and the government limits the number of new clergy. 6' However,
the government has relaxed controls somewhat on access to the clergy.
In 1981 rules were liberalized to permit the establishment of seminar-
ies.162 Individual temples and mosques may run their own training pro-
grams. Religious publications are printed in all languages that have
religious significance in China.'
6 3
When one's own religious beliefs begin to affect others, however,
the state may intervene. Article 36 of the 1982 Constitution clearly for-
bids discrimination based upon religious beliefs, or imposition of reli-
gious beliefs upon others. It has been reported that official government
policy forbids religious proselytizing other than at places of worship or
believers' homes and discourages conversion of those under eighteen
years of age."
The Chinese government has sought to attain a high degree of na-
tional organization and control over religious bodies and to isolate them
157. See 1987 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 106, at 671.
158. Id. at 671-72.
159. Id. at 671.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 672.
162. In 1987 the Catholic and Protestant churches each had ten seminaries in operation, the
Islamic Association had nine institutes to train imams and Islamic scholars, and the Buddhist
Association had approximately twenty institutes nationwide, including facilities in Lhasa. Id.
163. Id. at 671.
164. Id. at 670.
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from foreign influences. Every religious body must affiliate with one of
the eight national organizations representing Christianity, Buddhism,
Islam, and Daoism. The government required all Protestant denomina-
tions to merge in the 1950s, and the Chinese Catholic church was split
forcibly from Rome. Today there are five Chinese Christian organiza-
tions; two are Protestant and three are Catholic.165 There is no question
that these official religious organizations are subject to the leadership of
the Chinese state and the Communist Party.
One of the most sensitive areas of official concern is the potential
for foreign domination or influence over China's religious groups. This
concern is rooted deeply in the bitter history of China's earlier contacts
with the West when the influence of foreign missionaries was viewed as
an integral element in the Western domination and resulting national
humiliation of China. Article 36 of the 1982 Constitution asserts the
principle of independence clearly: "Religious bodies and religious affairs
are not subject to any foreign domination.' 1 6 Although the government
prohibits foreign missionaries from practicing among Chinese citizens,
it has allowed some foreign clergymen to enter for brief periods to serve
the resident foreign community. 67 The government carefully monitors
and controls contacts between Chinese and foreign religious organiza-
tions, although it has encouraged Chinese religious leaders to partici-
pate in international exchange activities. 68 In an effort to cultivate the
goodwill of Islamic nations and to gain support in critical minority ar-
eas of China, the government resumed giving permission to Muslim citi-
zens to make the Hajj in 1979. From 1985 to 1988 over 2000 Chinese
have made the trip to Mecca each year. Chinese religious organizations
also may accept unconditional gifts from foreign religious
organizations.
1 6 1
Official Chinese concern in this regard traditionally has focused on
the Vatican, in part because of its continued diplomatic ties with Tai-
wan. Loyalty to Rome simply will not be tolerated by the authorities.7 0
More recently, however, concern has focused on Tibetan loyalty to the
Dalai Lama, particularly because of the mixed political and religious
aspirations of his government-in-exile. While the Tibetan reverence of
the Dalai Lama as religious leader has been tolerated, the difficulty
arises in drawing a line of demarcation between religious and political
165. Id. at 670-71.
166. 1982 CONST., supra note 14, art. 36, English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-1982, supra
note 14, at 12.
167. 1987 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 106, at 672-73.
168. Id. at 672.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 673.
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allegiance and activities. Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution promotes
education to combat "feudal" ideas,'71 and the Chinese have identified
pre-1950 Tibet under the Dalai Lama as a feudal society.12 Article 15
states that "[d]isturbance of the socioeconomic order or disruption of
the state economic plan by any organization or individual is prohib-
ited. 1 73 The Chinese Criminal Law74 contains a wide variety of provi-
sions that might reach not only such overt activity as participation in
the Lhasa riots, but also covert, nonviolent subversion of Chinese poli-
cies. For example, the Criminal Law broadly reaches "crimes of coun-
terrevolution' 7 and "crimes of endangering public security. 176
China's human rights record clearly improved after reestablish-
ment of relations with the United States. That pattern of improvement
has continued in recent years, although recent developments, including
those in Tibet, have served as a reminder that China continues to be an
authoritarian society and that liberalization clearly has its limits. One
of the glaring deficiencies in the congressional findings supporting the
amendments to House Bill 1777 was the failure to acknowledge the spe-
cific advances China has made in human rights during the past decade
and its ongoing efforts to implement additional political liberalizations.
However, the Beijing Massacre and the subsequent repression of the
Tienanmen Square democracy movement of 1989 have rekindled the
congressional concerns expressed two years earlier.
There have been earlier popular demonstrations in China to pro-
mote freedom and democracy, but none has had such profound conse-
quences as the democracy movement of spring 1989. The first public
manifestations of the movement appeared when student protesters as-
sembled in the historic Tienanmen Square of Beijing to protest corrup-
tion in government and the Communist leadership's antidemocratic
policies.177 The movement quickly gained broad-based grass roots sup-
171. 1982 CONST., supra note 14, art. 24, English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-1982, supra
note 14, at 10.
172. See Tibetan Deputies on "Human Rights," BEIJING REV., Apr. 24-30, 1989, at 27.
173. 1982 CONST., supra note 14, art. 15, English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-1982, supra
note 14, at 9.
174. Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted at the Second Session of the
Fifth National People's Congress on July 1, 1979, promulgated by Order No. 5 of the Chairman of
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on July 6, 1979, and effective as of Jan.
1, 1980), English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-1982, supra note 14, at 87.
175. Id. ch. I, English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-1982, supra note 14, at 103.
176. Id. ch. II, English translation in 1 LAWS 1979-1982, supra note 14, at 105.
177. The Author arrived in Beijing on April 18, 1989, three days after the initial protests
began, and observed the demonstrations and interviewed participants for the next several weeks.
His observations on the 1989 democracy movement and the implications of the Beijing Massacre
on China's program of legal and economic reforms will be explored in an article (yet untitled) to be
published in 1989 in volume 23:1 of the George Washington Journal of International Law and
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port during the next seven weeks when it was joined by intellectuals,
journalists, workers, union representatives, and common people." '
Normally sensitive to any kind of open challenge, China's leaders
were embarrassed particularly by the timing of these demonstrations.
The Taiwan Finance Minister, Shirley Kuo, arrived in Beijing on May
1, 1989, for a meeting of the Asian Development Bank (ADB).1'7 9 Al-
though she was to have no official contact with the Beijing Govern-
ment'80 and limited her business to meetings with the ADB, the
Chinese leadership clearly hoped to use the occasion of her visit to
make a favorable impression on Taiwan. More importantly, Mikhail
Gorbachev, General Secretary to the Soviet Union, arrived in Beijing on
May 15, 1989, for the first official summit meeting between the two
Communist superpowers in thirty years.'
The Chinese security forces exercised restraint in dealing with the
protesters until two weeks after Gorbachev's departure. Units of the
Chinese 27th Army began to disperse forcefully demonstrators on June
3, 1989, but met resistance. By the early morning hours of June 4
soldiers were firing on unarmed civilian protesters in Tienanmen
Square and the streets of Beijing. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, were
killed and countless others were wounded.8 ' The world was horrified by
the regime's brutal repression of its own people, using tanks and auto-
matic assault rifles, apparently without discrimination, against unarmed
people in the Square and in the streets. 8" Although the conservative
Premier Li Peng was the official spokesman for the Government, the
real leader behind the repression clearly was Deng Xiaoping,8 4 the
eighty-four year old patriarch who emerged as the de facto leader of
China in 1978,185 and who holds no official position in government ex-
cept the powerful Chairmanship of the Military Commission.'
Economics.
178. For numerous contemporary accounts of the democracy movement appearing in the
popular press, see Leung, Beijing's Repressive Weapons Lose Edge, NEWSWEEK, May 29, 1989, at
14; Upheaval in China: A Tumultuous Struggle over the Destiny of a Nation, NEWSWEEK, May 29,
1989, at 14; Beijing Protest Swells to More Than a Million, Asian Wall St. J., May 18, 1989, at 1,
col. 3.
179. McGregor, Taiwan's Kuo Faces Tough Task in China, Asian Wall St. J., May 3, 1989,
at 1, col. 3.
180. Id. Mrs. Kuo's presence in Beijing was a particularly sensitive situation because Taiwan
and China each claims to be the legitimate government of all of China. Id.
181. Students Cast Shadow on Historic Talks, Asian Wall St. J., May 15, 1989, at 1, col. 3.
182. Despair and Death in a Beijing Square, TIME, June 12, 1989, at 10, 11-12.
183. Id.; see also Beijing Bloodbath, NEWSWEEK, June 12, 1989, at 24; Reign of Terror,
NEWSWEEK, June 19, 1989, at 14, 16.
184. See Butterfield, Hard Line: Deng Reappears with a Chilling Lesson About Power in
China, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1989, § 4, at 1, col. 1.
185. J. TOWNSEND & B. WOMACK, POLITICS IN CHINA 141 (3d ed. 1986).
186. Id. at 91. Deng reportedly was so offended by the student demonstration that he or-
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Early reports indicated that after the massacre there were open
conflicts in Beijing and elsewhere in China between different military
units of the Army,187 but the old guard conservatives clearly emerged in
control and imposed martial law to maintain dominance by military
units.18 8 World concern was heightened further as the postrepression
actions of the Deng regime suggested that China was falling back into
the chaos of the Cultural Revolution.'8 9 Party Chairman Zhao Ziyang,
former premier and a leader of China's reform movement, abruptly dis-
appeared from public view and later was stripped of his official
position. 19 0
The Chinese Government boldly denied the essential facts of the
confrontation, despite the fact that they had been recorded and publi-
cized in graphic detail by the world's news media.19' The Chinese Gov-
ernment denounced its critics, and rejoined that no one had died in
Tienanmen Square on the fourth of June, and that when the Army
cleared the Square, student protesters left peacefully, with banners fly-
ing. According to this official version, any trouble that had occurred was
caused elsewhere in Beijing by a counterrevolutionary rebellion of thugs
who were attempting to overthrow the Communist state.19 The United
States news media was accused of spreading falsehoods and
rumormongering.'9 3 Premier Li Peng stated further that the incident
was "a good thing" because it gave the Party "another severe test.'' 94
Amid fears of widespread purge, Chinese security forces arrested hun-
dreds and systematically executed many who were involved in the
dered the army to move in and quash the movement, "no matter what the cost," as early as April
27, 1989. See Leung, Party Blocked Call from Deng for Crackdown, Asian Wall St. J., May 12-13,
1989, at 1, col. 3. The crackdown was delayed by many senior Communist Party officials who
risked his wrath by urging the Central Government to exercise restraint, and not to use violence.
Id.
187. See Trainor, An Army's Agony, N.Y. Times, June 19, 1989, at A10, col. 1; Kristof,
Moderates Appear on Beijing TV, Easing Fears of Wholesale Purge, N.Y. Times, June 14, 1989,
at Al, col. 4; Army Factions Battle in Beijing, Witnesses Say, Asian Wall St. J., June 7, 1989, at 1,
col. 6.
188. See Martial Law to Last till "All Back to Normal," China Daily, July 12, 1989, at 1, col.
1.
189. See Kristof, Unleashing the Dark Methods of the Cultural Revolution, N.Y. Times,
June 18, 1989, § 4, at 1, col. 1.
190. Small Carrot, Big Stick, NEWSWEEK, July 3, 1989, at 28, 29. Later reports disclosed that
Zhao was under house arrest in his official residence in Zhongnanhai. Deng Talks Again of Plan to
Retire, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1989, § 1, at 9, col. 1.
191. See, e.g., Dealing Death with a Big Lie, NEWSWEEK, June 26, 1989, at 26; see also
Deng's Big Lie, TIME, June 26, 1989, at 6.
192. See Dealing Death with a Big Lie, supra note 191, at 26.
193. U.S. News Media in China's Riot, China Daily, July 13, 1989, at 4, col. 2.




The brutality of the crackdown sent shock waves throughout those
areas China considered its traditional lands and which it currently is
trying to bring back under its control. Most immediately threatened
was Hong Kong, the economically powerful British enclave destined to
return to Chinese control in 1997196 under the Chinese promise that its
capitalist system will remain undisturbed for fifty years.197 Although its
response was measured, Taiwan also was gravely concerned by a re-
newed fear of threat from Beijing.19
Beijing's crushing of the democracy movement was a serious set-
back for the cordial relations that had developed between China and
the Western democracies during China's reform era.99 Many Western
businessmen who had invested heavily in China during the heady era of
economic reforms scrambled to get out.2 00 President Bush, responding
in measured terms,2 1 immediately ordered a suspension of American
military sales to China. 2  At the subsequent economic summit in Paris,
representatives of the United States and six other major Western pow-
195. Chinese Execute 24 More People, Including 7 from Beijing Protests, N.Y. Times, June
23, 1989, at Al, col. 4; Chinese Arrest 400 in Beijing Amid Fears of a Wide Purge; Roundups on
in Other Cities, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 4; Shanghai Reports Dissidents' Arrest,
N.Y. Times, June 11, 1989, § 1, at 8, col. 1. The United States Secretary of State and leaders from
many other nations lodged strong official protests against the events and executions. See Baker
Denounces Executions of Chinese Protesters, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1989, at A10, col. 4.
196. See generally HONG KONG IN TRANSITION, supra note 21; HONG KONG AND 1997: STRATE-
GIES FOR THE FUTURE (1985). The Portuguese colony of Macao also returns to China on December
20, 1999. Joint Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Portugal on the Question of Macao, reprinted in EDIC6ES EM LiNGUAS
ESTRANGEIRAS, DECLARACRO CONJUNTA SINO-PORTUGUESA SOBRE A QUESTAO DE MACAU 59 (1987).
197. See Reiss, Specter of 1997, NEWSWEEK INT'L, July 3, 1989, at 16, 17; Wong, Hong Kong
Is Jolted into Grim Visions of Transition in 1997, Asian Wall St. J., June 8, 1989, at 1, col. 3.
198. See Wu Wen-Cheng & Chen I-Hsin, Tiananmen Is Also a Tragedy for Taiwan, Asian
Wall St. J., July 6, 1989, at 8, col. 3.
199. Kristof, Relations with U.S. Seem Badly Hurt by Crushing of Democracy Protests,
N.Y. Times, June 11, 1989, § 1, at 16, col. 1.
200. See China: Now, Where Were We?, NEWSWEEK INT'L, July 3, 1989, at 44; Foreigners
Scramble to Leave Beijing, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1989, at A9, col. 1; Companies Speeding Beijing
Exodus, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1989, at D7, col. 3.
201. See Gergen, A Cautious Man Plays China by the Book, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June
5, 1989, at 27.
202. Bush Order May Affect Grumman, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1989, at D7, col. 1; Bush Sus-
pends Sales of Weapons to China, Halts Military Links, Asian Wall St. J., June 6, 1989, at 1, col.
5. Prior to the Beijing Massacre, expansion of security cooperation with China was being given
consideration by the United States. See, e.g., H. GAss, SINO-AMERICAN SECURITY RELATIONS 1
(1984). Although President Bush's immediate sanction actions limited military relations and high
technology exports, subsequent sanctions imposed by the White House in late June included sus-
pension of high-level government exchanges and pressures to postpone new loans from interna-
tional lending institutions. See Bush Imposes More Sanctions Against Beijing, Asian Wall St. J.,
June 21, 1989, at 1, col. 6.
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ers agreed to impose economic sanctions on China. 03 The flow of for-
eign tourism to China, which had brought in 2.2 billion dollars for
China in 1988, dried up and remained at only a trickle in the aftermath
of the incident. 04
Members of Congress appeared very dissatisfied with the Presi-
dent's measured approach. Several different amendments to the For-
eign Aid Authorization Bill for fiscal years 1990 and 1991 were
introduced that severely would curtail United States exports of com-
puters, weapons, satellites, and financing to China.0 5 Thus, the broad
chasm of disagreement between congressional and presidential percep-
tions of appropriate United States foreign policy toward China evi-
denced by the "Tibet Question" not only continues, but appears to
have been exacerbated by the 1989 repression.
VII. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
The conventional judicial wisdom holds that the United States
speaks with one voice on matters of foreign policy through the federal
government: "'[F]or national purposes, embracing our relations with
foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power.' "206 Un-
fortunately, the federal government too often speaks through two
voices, that of the President and the Congress, on sensitive foreign af-
fairs issues. The resulting dissonance undermines the effectiveness and
credibility of American foreign policy. The congressional role in foreign
relations should be considered; specifically, did Congress usurp presi-
dential powers in foreign relations by its positions on the "Tibet Ques-
tion"? Even if this question has no clear answer, the practical question
remains whether the best interests of the United States are served
when Congress disrupts established foreign relation policies of the exec-
utive branch. Consensus clearly exists that the United States possesses
all the "foreign affairs powers" of a sovereign nation, and that this
power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty, 07 but the debate contin-
203. The decision to halt official and multilateral agency credit to China was the main choice
of protest the major industrial nations took. An early step was the freezing of $10 billion (United
States dollars) in aid projects from the World Bank and Japan. The most painful and immediate
impact came from the World Bank's decision, under pressure from the United States and Europe,
to freeze loans totaling $780.2 million (United States dollars), which had been slated for approval
by the end of June. World Bank Forced to Defer China Loans, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 6, 1989, at
69.
204. WuDunn, For the Tourists, an Even More Forbidding City, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1989,
at A4, col. 3.
205. Congress, Angry at China, Moves to Impose Sanctions, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1989, at
A5, col. 1.
206. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 442 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting The Chi-
nese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889)).
207. See Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U.S. 378, 396 (1933).
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ues over the proper allocation of the foreign affairs power between the
legislative and executive branches. Although disagreements between
these branches over domestic policies are not uncommon, the whole
world becomes a stage for display of United States governmental
gridlock when the two branches of government work at cross purposes
in foreign relations.
This debate initially started during America's early constitutional
era, with Alexander Hamilton and James Madison taking sides over
which branch of government should preside over foreign affairs. The
Hamilton-Madison dispute over presidential versus congressional pow-
ers in foreign affairs continues to be one of the longest running debates
in United States constitutional history. Hamilton argued in favor of
presidential supremacy in foreign affairs. Presidential powers in foreign
affairs emanate from article II of the Constitution, which contains spe-
cific enumerations of powers, including the power to make treaties, with
the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate; and to appoint ambassa-
dors, public ministers, and consuls with the Senate's advice and con-
sent.2 8 As Commander in Chief, the President clearly has enormous
influence over the conduct of foreign affairs.20 9 Hamilton argued that
the first clause of article II constituted a general grant of power to the
executive not limited by the specific enumeration of powers which fol-
lowed: "The executive powers shall be vested in a President of the
United States .... ,,21o According to Hamilton's theory, any foreign af-
fairs power not specifically granted to Congress under the Constitution
was reserved to the President through the executive power clause."'
Because the early Supreme Court often was reluctant to serve as
umpire in executive-legislative branch disputes, early assertions of
power by the President sometimes were approved tacitly by the Court's
failure to interfere.212 On occasion, the early Congress even appeared to
share an expansive view of presidential powers. For example, the Sen-
208. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
209. See id. art. II, § 2.
210. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT OFFICE AND POWERS 179-81 (4th rev. ed. 1957) (citing 7 THE
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 76 (H. Lodge ed. 1904)).
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Less than a year later,
however, Chief Justice Marshall did not even discuss the "political question" option, and held that
the President's enumerated powers as Commander in Chief of the armed forces did not allow him
to order seizure of foreign vessels beyond the specific authorization granted by Congress. See Little
v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). See generally Glennon, Two Views of Presidential For-
eign Affairs Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-Wright?, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 5 (1988). The debate
has continued to have contemporary viability. For example, President Nixon vetoed the War Pow-
ers Resolution of Congress as an unconstitutional infringement on his powers as Commander in




ate Committee on Foreign Relations stated on February 15, 1816:
"'The President is the constitutional representative of the United
States with regard to foreign nations. He manages our concerns with
foreign nations . . The nature of transactions with foreign nations,
moreover, requires caution and unity of design, and their success fre-
quently depends on secrecy and dispatch.' "21"
When Congress and the President were in accord, the Court has
echoed similar language in constitutional disputes initiated by third
parties. For example, in Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Water-
man Steamship Corp.,21 4 the Court upheld the grant of an overseas air
route to Chicago & Southern Air Lines and denial of the route to its
rival, Waterman Steamship Corp., pursuant to an executive order is-
sued under congressional authorization. The Court held that the por-
tion of the order which was based upon presidential powers alone was
not subject to judicial review:
The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's organ for foreign
affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not and ought not to be
published to the world. It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant
information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on
information properly held secret .... [T]he very nature of executive decisions as
to foreign policy is political, not judicial. 15
The most commonly cited contemporary reference to this type of
Hamiltonian view is Justice Sutherland's decision in the leading case of
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,1 6 in which the Supreme
Court concluded that:
[T]he President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the
nation .... As Marshall said in his great argument of March 7, 1800, in the House
of Representatives, "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations. 1 7
The era spanning the Watergate through the Iran-Contra scandals
has left little untarnished about the executive image and has resulted in
greater congressional distrust and assertiveness in foreign affairs and
other areas that otherwise might be left largely to executive discretion.
James Madison's original thesis that Congress, and not the President,
should be dominant in foreign affairs has been revived with a ven-
geance, although the current fervor stops short of congressional de-
mands for total dominance.
James Madison's position was in direct opposition to Hamilton's;
213. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (quoting U.S.
Senate Reports, Committee on Foreign Relations, vol. 8, at 24 (1816)).
214. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
215. Id. at 111.
216. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
217. Id. at 319.
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Madison asserted that Congress enjoyed broad powers under the ex-
press and implied constitutional grants, and that the President's powers
in foreign affairs were limited specifically.21 Authority for congressional
action affecting foreign affairs can be found in several articles of the
Constitution. Article I, section 8 defines congressional powers broadly:
"Congress shall have Power to provide for the common Defense,. . . to
regulate foreign commerce, . . . and to define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the law of
Nations."2 19 Congress also has the power to declare war, to make rules
of war, to grant letters of marque and reprisal,220 and to raise, support,
and regulate an army and a navy.221 Treaties require approval by two-
thirds of the Senate before ratification, and the Senate is empowered to
advise the President on the terms of the treaty.2 22 Finally, international
postal agreements may be authorized by Congress under the "postal
power" clause. 23
In addition to the above specific constitutional grants of congres-
sional power affecting foreign affairs, there are a variety of ways in
which Congress can interfere with presidential attempts to exercise for-
eign affairs powers. The congressional power over the purse, for exam-
ple, is a very effective means for limiting presidential aspirations in the
international arena. By exercise of congressional powers under the
"spending power" clause,224 Congress virtually can veto programs essen-
tial to the presidential foreign affairs agenda. One of the most fertile
sources of congressional power in modern times has been the commerce
clause, 25 which continues to be used to regulate United States foreign
trade. The United States only recently has emerged from a posture of
relative nonchalance toward world trade matters. The exercise of the
commerce clause by Congress no doubt will result in ever-increasing in-
fluence over foreign affairs because the United States now faces a highly
competitive international market and the immediate necessity for ac-
tive participation in that market in order to remain a major player in
the world economy. The "necessary and proper" clause also has been
used to control the exercise of presidential foreign affairs power. Article
I, section 8 provides that Congress has the power "[t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
218. E. CORWIN, supra note 210, at 180-82, 184-85 (citing 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
138 (G. Hunt ed. 1900)).
219. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
220. Id. § 8, cl. 11.
221. Id. § 8, cls. 12, 13.
222. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
223. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
224. Id. § 8, cl. 1.
225. Id. § 8, cl. 3.
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* . . Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States or in any Department or Officer thereof.
'2 26
Early Supreme Court decisions recognized congressional power in
foreign affairs, 227 and various theories upholding congressional powers
in foreign affairs have been sustained by contemporary decisions as
well.228 Even in Curtiss-Wright, the decision so often quoted in support
of an expansive view of presidential powers, Justice Sutherland ac-
knowledged that the "foreign affairs power" arising from the sovereign
status of the United States included some congressional authority in
international matters.22 9 The Supreme Court has upheld significant for-
eign affairs powers for Congress that are only implied by the Constitu-
tion. For example, in Perez v. Brownell,"'0 the Court sustained a
congressional exercise of power affecting foreign affairs by upholding
the Nationality Act of 1940. The Court stated:
[W]hat is the source of power on which Congress must be assumed to have drawn?
Although there is in the Constitution no specific grant to Congress of power to
enact legislation for the effective regulation of foreign affairs, there can be no doubt
of the existence of this power in the law-making organ of the Nation ... [A] Fed-
eral Government to conduct the affairs of that nation must be held to have granted
that Government the powers indispensable to its functioning effectively in the com-
pany of sovereign nations. The Government must be able not only to deal affirma-
tively with foreign nations,. . . [it must also be able to reduce to a minimum the
frictions that are unavoidable in a world of sovereigns sensitive in matters touching
their dignity and interests.2 31
Because conflicts over the allocation of foreign affairs powers often
have been considered by the Supreme Court to constitute a "political
question," the Hamilton-Madison debate has not been resolved by the
judicial branch. As stated by Justice Brennan in writing for the Court
in Baker v. Carr,'23 "The conduct of the foreign relations of our Gov-
ernment is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legis-
lative-'the political'-Departments of the Government, and the
propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is
not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. '233 On occasion, the Court
has avoided direct intervention in such "political questions," but has
resolved the matter indirectly by allowing to stand action by the branch
226. Id. § 8, cl. 18.
227. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); The Chinese Exclusion
Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
228. See, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 182 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
229. 299 U.S. at 318-19.
230. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
231. Id. at 57 (citation omitted). Perez subsequently was overruled on other grounds in
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
232. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
233. Id. at 211 n.31 (quoting Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)).
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of government that appears to be acting within the scope of its consti-
tutional authority.23 4 It cannot be said that Congress has no power to
enact legislation conditioning United States foreign economic relations
on the satisfaction of specific congressional requirements.
To the extent that congressional actions toward China and the Da-
lai Lama constituted recognition of the Dalai Lama as head of the inde-
pendent State of Tibet, however, a good argument can be made that
Congress exceeded its powers. In United States v. Belmont23 5 the Su-
preme Court sustained the presidential exercise of powers in recogniz-
ing a foreign government. The Soviet Union had seized and
nationalized property of an American corporation within its territories.
The Soviet Union's appropriation extended to a bank account originally
held by the American corporation in a New York bank. Pursuant to an
agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, the Soviet
Union assigned its rights in the account to the government of the
United States. When the United States government attempted to col-
lect the money, the bank refused to pay. In the resulting litigation, the
Supreme Court held for the United States and stated:
We take judicial notice of the fact that coincident with the assignment set forth in
the complaint, the President recognized the Soviet government and normal diplo-
matic relations were established between that government and the Government of
the United States, followed by an exchange of ambassadors. The effect of this was
to validate, so far as this country is concerned, all acts of the Soviet Government
here involved from the commencement of its existence .... That the negotiations,
acceptance of the assignment and agreements and understandings in respect
thereof were within the competence of the President may not be doubted .... And
in respect of what was done here, the Executive had authority to speak as the sole
organ of that government. The assignment and the agreements in connection there-
with did not, as in the case of treaties, as that term is used in the treaty making
clause of the Constitution (Art. II, § 2), require the advice and consent of the
Senate." 6
The audience accorded to the Dalai Lama before the United States
Congress in September 1987 was more befitting to a head of state than
to a religious leader. The Dalai Lama's five point program introduced
before Congress and strongly supported by some members of Congress,
as laudable as its goals may be, rightly could be interpreted by China
and the rest of the world as nothing less than a challenge to China's
sovereignty in Tibet. Congress improperly received the Dalai Lama as
the head of the Tibetan government-in-exile to make a "political state-
ment"2 37 advancing his position that Tibet is an independent state
234. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 213-14, 449-50 n.26 (1972).
235. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
236. Id. at 330 (emphasis added).
237. 133 CONG. REC. E3641 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1987) (remarks of Rep. Tom Lantos).
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under illegal occupation.2 8 It was improper not only because it repre-
sented an attempted usurpation of presidential powers to recognize and
receive foreign heads of state, it also directly contravened all other con-
gressional and executive acts in the continuous pattern of recognition of
China for more than a decade.
Undeniably, however, the Congress possesses the power to take
public positions, as representatives of the American people, on matters
affecting United States foreign policy. The divergence of opinion be-
tween Congress and the President on certain aspects of the United
States-China relationship is inevitable, and is not resolved by any inter-
pretation of their respective powers under the Constitution. Rather, it
is a political problem that must be resolved through political means.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Part of the problem in assessing the events surrounding the "Tibet
Question" is that the energy expended on the subject generally has pro-
duced more heat than light. The United States Congress focused almost
exclusively on the highly emotional aspects of human rights with little
or no apparent effort to separate the political aspirations of the Dalai
Lama's program from his religious and human rights concerns. The
Chinese also responded to the congressional accusations from an emo-
tional plane. Chinese authorities appear to have overreacted to the riots
in Tibet. To the extent that China disregarded fundamental individual
rights as guaranteed by its own laws in the suppression of those disor-
ders, it rightly may be subjected to world criticism. However, as a sov-
ereign power, it also has the inherent police power to suppress rioting in
the streets that endangers public order and safety.
The quality of the facts cited by Congress in House Bill 1777 also
was poor; most of the allegations related to events that occurred during
the Cultural Revolution under former leader Mao Zedong, who died in
1976. The 1987 congressional allegations of human rights abuses had
little foundation in hard data or information, and seemed to reflect or
parrot the Dalai Lama's accusations.
The 1989 Beijing Massacre and China's subsequent acts of repres-
sion are a different matter but clearly exacerbate concerns for the pro-
spective treatment of the Tibetan people. The massacre itself and the
widespread arrests and executions that followed raise considerable
doubts about the continued viability of China's ambitious law-making
efforts of the past ten years,"" in which individual rights and protec-
tions received unprecedented attention. In short, the question of
238. Proposal for Peace and Accommodation in Tibet-Statement of the Dalai Lama, id.
239. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
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whether the incumbent Deng regime can be counted on to make a sin-
cere commitment to the rule of law is still pending. For many, Beijing
has lost its credibility. Just before the massacre occurred, Beijing sent a
message to the Dalai Lama indicating that the Chinese Government
wanted to discuss the Tibetan situation.24 After the student democracy
movement was crushed, however, the Dalai Lama expressed reluctance
to enter such discussions because he was concerned that "the Chinese
Government may not be the people's government." 4 1
When the United States has a special relationship with another
country, such as the special economic relationship that has been devel-
oping with China for more than a decade, the United States should be
able to communicate its concerns over human rights and other legiti-
mate matters through proper channels without fear of jeopardizing the
underlying relationship. However, it is important to rationalize the de-
bate over the Tibetan situation by recognizing that there are two re-
lated but severable issues. The human rights question is a matter of
legitimate concern for the American people and their elected represent-
atives. Involvement in the separatist movement, however, and the polit-
ical programs advocated by the Dalai Lama, are not legitimate roles for
Congress. Until these issues are clearly identified and dealt with sepa-
rately, legitimate concern over human rights violations in Tibet will be
diluted.
The process of institutionalizing the relationship between China
and the United States has seen remarkable advances during the past
decade. Those advances were achieved by careful planning, deliberate
actions, and due regard for the respective sovereign interests of both
nations. Since the initial United States recognition of the Government
of the People's Republic of China, Tibet has been considered a part of
China. No country in the world has recognized Tibet as an independent
nation, and no country has qualified its recognition of China by an ex-
clusion of the Tibet Autonomous Region. If either the executive or leg-
islative branch chooses to take such a position, that branch has had
ample opportunity with each successive treaty or intergovernmental
United States-China agreement to do so.
The difficulties arising from the "Tibet Question" debate also em-
phasize the need for greater Chinese appreciation of the importance of
human rights in the free world economic order. In the long term, suc-
cessful economic relations with the United States require the recogni-
tion and observance of fundamental human rights. Otherwise, the
American people, speaking through both the Congress and the Presi-




dent, will begin to chafe under the relationship. As China, the Soviet
Union, and other Communist.nations seek to modernize their own econ-
omies through an increased opening to the West, it is timely that this
reality in East-West relations be confronted by the East.
As an ideological leader in the free world, the United States has an
obligation to provide leadership in human rights reform. But when that
leadership is asserted in the form of intervention in the domestic affairs
of another state, it should be measured, consistent with the goal to be
accomplished, unassailable in its factual foundations, and coordinated
through the foreign policy-making channels of government. Just as im-
portantly, the goals of such intervention should be reconciled with the
United States' overall interests, including geostrategic interests.
Much of the rancor generated between the United States Congress
and China by the "Tibet Question" has subsided, but the momentum in
the developing relationship between the United States and China may
have cooled as well. The greatest beneficiaries of the unrest in Tibet
likely were the hard-liners in Beijing who oppose China's current liber-
alization movement . 42 The controversy brought to light some funda-
mental truths about relationships between Communist countries and
the free world. Despite China's economic reforms and opening to the
West, now followed by the Soviet Union's related version of perestroika
(restructuring), some very basic differences remain in the way the lead-
ers in our diverse political systems view the relationship between indi-
viduals and the state. China remains essentially an authoritarian nation
that still does not share many of the values of freedom that are the
pillars of the United States system of government. Although the eco-
nomic liberalizations in China appeared to have been leading to politi-
cal liberalizations as well, fundamental differences in our two systems
will remain for a very long time, perhaps forever. At the time of this
writing, great uncertainty remains over the future directions of China's
reform movement. The repression begun with the Beijing Massacre con-
tinues to pose the single greatest threat to the maintenance of cordial
relations between the United States and China. The problems in that
relationship, from the "Tibet Question" to the present, were exacer-
bated greatly by the Tienanmen Square incident of June 4, 1989, and
its aftermath.
The stakes are high for both countries in the United States-China
relationship, and the long-term success of that relationship requires
consistency and reliability in our mutual dealings. For the United
States, it is essential that a coherent, credible, and cohesive United
242. Kristof, Tibet Unrest Said to Aid Hard-Liners in Beijing, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1987, at
A12, col. 1; see also Unrest Rocks the Calm of "Shangri-La," supra note 1, at 10.
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States-China policy be developed and observed consistently, with gov-
ernment policy makers speaking with one voice on that policy's funda-
mental aspects.

